Securing the Connected Car

MENDER.io

Deploy Software Updates for Linux Devices

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The software defined car

Electronics | Telematics | Infotainment | Connected | Assisted driving | Autonomous

Hardware enabled | Software enabled | Software defined

1990 | 2000 | 2010 | 2020

About me

- Eystein Stenberg
  - 7 years in systems security management
  - M. Sc., Computer Science, Cryptography
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- Mender.io
  - Over-the-air updater for Linux, Yocto
  - Under active development
  - Open source

Session overview

- Opportunities with the software defined car
- Anatomy of an attack: security risks of the connected car
- The patching problem & solution designs

Software defined car: New revenue streams

- Tesla
  - Semi-autonomous Autopilot feature allows current Model S owners to add the feature for $2,500 USD when they order the vehicle or they can pay $3,000 USD to upgrade later
  - An OTA update system allows for easy additional software purchases **after** buyers drive their cars off the lot
- Morgan Stanley report
  - *"Selling content to occupants of the car could be a significant new revenue stream"*
- Navigant Research
  - Automakers could add up to $27.1B/annually from services such as car sharing and more

Cost savings by using open source platforms



- Lower layers are *expensive* and provides *no differentiation*
- Use open source here to
  - Shorten time-to-market
  - Lower cost
  - Reallocate development to differentiating features

The software defined car requires OTA updates

- Increased software complexity requires more frequent improvements
- ABI Research
  - Estimates that 1/3rd of current recalls are for problems that could be fixed OTA
- IHS Automotive
  - Estimates OTA updates will save carmakers $35B in 2022
- Fiat Chrysler hack required a recall of 1.4 million vehicles
  - Software security flaw that allowed hackers to takeover Jeep Cherokee
  - The flaw could have been remediated via software over-the-air

Jeep Cherokee hacked in July 2015

- Presented at Black Hat USA 2015
  - Charlie Miller
  - Chris Valasek
- Remote exploit giving full control of the car
- Clearly demonstrates physical safety risk
- No way to fix remotely
- 1.4 million cars recalled

Jeep Cherokee Head Unit with Wifi

Wifi hotspot offered as a service

“Head unit”, “IVI”

- Cherokee customers can buy wifi subscription as an add-on (~$40/month)
- Connect devices in the car to the car’s wifi to get online (phones, tablets, …)
- Wifi is password protected

Wifi-based breach: Short-range

Guessable password

Software vulnerability

- Wifi **password** based on **system time after provisioning**
- January 01 2013 00:00 GMT +- 1 minute
- Multimedia system breached due to software vulnerability
- Scope: Control music player/radio/volume and track GPS coordinates when **within wifi range**

Cellular-based breach: Country-wide



Breach Sprint Cellular network

Software vulnerability

- Scope: Control music player/radio/volume and track GPS coordinates **countrywide**
- Can also select a specific Jeep based on its GPS-coordinates

The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus



- The CAN bus connects ~70 electronic control units (ECUs), including *engine control*, *transmission*, *airbags*, *braking*

- V850 chip is designed to **only read** from the CAN bus, to isolate components

CAN bus



- The head unit can **update the firmware** of the V850
- Firmware **update authenticity not checked** properly

Putting it together



Lessons

- Wifi hotspot password was predictable
- Remotely accessible service (in head unit) was vulnerable (and not updated)
- Firmware update (for V850) did not have proper authenticity checks
- The only way to fix the vulnerabilities is through a manual update (by customer or dealership)

More complexity leads to larger attack surface

- 1-25 bugs per 1000 lines of code*
  - Assume that all software components have vulnerabilities

- Rely on well-maintained software and keep it updated
  - Open source vs. proprietary is a red herring
  - Do not build all the software in-house

- Principle of least privilege

- Separation of privilege

- Kerckhoff's principle

**Source: Steve McConnell, Code Complete*

Security patching is done too late



Source: How the Rise in Non-Targeted Attacks Has Widened the Remediation Gap, Kenna Security

Why security patching happens too late

- The value is invisible until too late
- Too costly or risky
    - Manual? Too expensive to integrate updater?
    - Requires downtime of production? Risk of breaking production?
- Politics
- How often do *you* patch?
    - Do you have a way to do it? A process?
    - Often not a core competence and not a priority to develop updater

Patching connected devices is harder

- No/expensive physical access
    - Need failure management
- Unreliable power
    - What if power disappears in the middle of patching?
- Unreliable (wireless) network connectivity
    - Handle partial downloads
    - Ideally resume downloads in expensive networks like 3G
- Public and insecure (wireless) networks
    - Can someone inject arbitrary code during the update process?
    - Verify authenticity of update

Embedded client patching process overview



Choice of update type has tradeoffs

	Full image	Package (opkg, ...)	tar.gz	Docker/Containers
Download size	Large*	Small	Small	Medium
Installation time	Long*	Short	Short	Short
Rollback	Yes (dual partition)	Hard	Hard	Yes
Consistency	Yes	Medium	Hard	Yes
Design impact	Bootloader, Partition layout	Package manager	tar, ...	Kernel, docker

* Can mitigate with compression or binary diffs

Strategies to reduce the risk of bricking

- Integrity checking
  - This must be done
  - Easy to implement
- Rollback support
  - This should be a requirement: power loss, installation error, etc.
  - Could be hard depending on update type (tarball, package)
- Phased rollout
  - I.e. don’t deploy update to all devices in one go
  - Most do this to some extent: test & production environments
  - Can be more granular on device population (1%, 10%, 25%, 50%, ...)



Prepare for securing the software defined car

- Open source software where no differentiation
- Well-maintained software
- Over-the-air updates
- Apply well-known security design principles